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Comment
Tied Up by a "Gordian Knot":
United States v. Gecas's
Rejection of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in Cases of Foreign Prosecution
Daniel J. Lindsay*
On August 2, 1962, Vytautas Gecas, a Lithuanian citizen,
applied for a visa to enter the United States.' On his visa ap-
plication he stated that he was a student in Lithuania during
most of World War II, then later lived in a refugee camp in
Germany from 1944 to 1947.2 In 1991, the Justice Department's
Office of Special Investigations (OSI), issued Gecas a subpoena
to testify, claiming that Gecas served as a member of a
Lithuanian armed police unit during World War 11 and perse-
cuted persons because of their race, religion, and national origin.3
In an interview before the OSI, Gecas invoked the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to answer questions posed by the OSI investigators.4
In response, the United States petitioned the district court
for an order to enforce the OSrs subpoena.5 The district court
granted the government's petition, despite finding that Gecas
faced a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.6 An
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; MA. 1996,
University of Minnesota; BA. 1991, Claremont McKenna College.
1. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
bane), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1997) (No. 97-
884).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 1423. The Attorney General created the OSI to detect and
investigate individuals in the United States who assisted the Nazis during the
war. See id. at 1423 n.3. If a court found that Gecas engaged in such conduct,
he would become deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(D). See id. at 1423.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See United States v. Gecas, 830 F. Supp. 1403, 1423 (N.D. Fla. 1993),
affid in part, rev'd in part, 50 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'd en bane, 120
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Eleventh Circuit panel reversed the district court's decision.7
The Eleventh Circuit later granted a rehearing en banc and
upheld the district court's decision!
United States v. Gecas raises the question of whether a
witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination based on a real and substantial risk of
prosecution in a foreign country. This issue is of great impor-
tance because any resolution must both define the scope of the
privilege and account for its varying policy considerations. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari9 on a case out of the Second
Circuit presenting facts similar to Gecas.0 How the Court de-
cides the issue should help order the discussion on an issue
that has divided courts and scholars."
This Comment contends that the privilege against self-
incrimination applies to witnesses who can show a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution. Part I discusses the
historical interpretations of the privilege, the Supreme Court's
treatment of the privilege, and the lower court decisions exam-
ining the privilege. Part II outlines the holding and reasoning
in United States v. Gecas. Part Ill critiques the Gecas decision
and argues that the Eleventh Circuit's narrow interpretation of
the privilege incorrectly assumed that the Fifth Amendment is
only violated by the use of compelled testimony and in so doing
misread Supreme Court precedent. This Comment concludes
that the Supreme Court should consider the privilege's multiple
policy rationales, acknowledge the close interaction between
American and foreign law enforcement, and interpret the policy
broadly to cover cases where there is potential for foreign
prosecution.
F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997).
7. United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995).
8. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1422 (11th Cir. 1995).
9. United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 751 (1998).
10. United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 751 (1998); see also infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (discussing
the Second Circuit's holding in Balsys, which involved a subpoena brought by
the OSI to force a resident alien to testify in order to determine whether he
lied on his immigration application).
1L See Akdl Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 857-58
(1995) (asserting that both courts and scholars have been unable to define the
scope of the privilege).
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I. THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
AND FEAR OF FOREIGN PROSECUTION
A. HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE
Despite its prominent place in the Bill of Rights, the origin
and meaning of the Fifth Amendment remain contested.' 2 Re-
cent scholars have called the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment an "unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a
Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights." 3 The lack of
legislative history accompanying the amendment has led to
confusion among courts and disparate interpretations among
scholars.'4
The first notable inquiry into the Self-Incrimination Clause
came from John Wigmore.'5 Wigmore argued that the common
law in England adopted the privilege in the mid-1600s.' 6 In the
1960s, Leonard Levy endorsed and expanded on Wigmore's inter-
pretation. 7 Levy's interpretation soon became, and has remained
until recently, the accepted wisdom on the Fifth Amendment. Ac-
cording to Levy, the privilege developed as a product of two com-
peting systems of criminal procedure in England at the time-the
common law and the crown's ecclesiastical courts. 8 Popular pro-
12. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination reads that
"n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Amar & Lettow, supra note 11, at 857.
14. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTITUTION 248-255 (1988) (describing the almost complete lack of legisla-
tive history accompanying the Fifth Amendment, either in the form of debate
when it was first introduced or during the ratification process of the Bill of
Rights); Arthur B. Laby, Note, Fishing for Documents Overseas: The Supreme
Court Upholds Broad Consent Directives Against the Claim of Self-
Incrimination, 70 B.U. L. REV. 311, 313-14 (1990) (citing eleven different val-
ues courts and commentators have said the Fifth Amendment protects);
Christine L. Reimann, Note, Fencing the Fifth Amendment in Our Own Back-
yard, 7 PACE INTL L. REv. 177, 178-79 (1995) (noting the differing interpreta-
tions of the origin of the privilege against self-incrimination).
15. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§§ 2250-2284 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
16. See id. § 2250, at 289 (explaining the adoption of the privilege into the
common law).
17. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 247-66; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINs OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968).
18. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 260-61. Levy identified the inherited
English common law system of criminal justice as the origin of the privilege
against self-incrimination. See id. at 260. The origin of the privilege in England
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test to the ecclesiastical courts' inquisitorial methods led Parlia-
ment to abolish the ecclesiastical courts, the Court of High Com-
mission and the Star Chamber, in 1641 and to prohibit authorities
from compelling confession or self-accusation. 9 Levy argues that
the privilege against self-incrimination became closely associated
with freedom of speech and religion, and by the eighteenth cen-
tury, was "taken for granted."2° As the major components of the
English common law were adopted in America, the right against
self-incrimination took hold. 1 Thus, according to Levy, it is no
surprise that there was little or no debate when James Madison
introduced what would become the Fifth Amendment.' Levy ex-
plains that the protection against self-incrimination had become
so accepted by the end of eighteenth century America that "its
constitutional expression had the mechanical quality of a ritualistic
gesture in favor of a self-evident truth needing no explanation."23
Levy's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment privilege has
come under attack in the past decade as a group of scholars has
begun to reassess the historical origins of the privilege and its
development in America.' One of these new interpretations
argues that the privilege against self-incrimination actually
originated in continental Europe in the form of Roman and
canon law, then later developed in English common law. 5
represented a combination of religious, political, and social forces active dur-
ing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See id.
19. See id. at 262. Elizabeth I established the Court of High Commission
to maintain religious uniformity under the Anglican church. See id. at 261.
The courts actively prosecuted religious and political dissidents. See id. De-
spite the ban on the compulsion of testimony, the common law courts contin-
ued to use many of the same tactics to compel answers from suspects. See id.
at 262. Levy asserts, however, that the idea of a protection against self-
incrimination was "beginning to take hold of men's minds." Id. at 263.
20. Id. at 265.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 247, 258.
23. Id. at 258.
24. For example, R.H. Helmholz argues that Levy's work neglects the im-
portance of the legal context in the development of the privilege, and instead
focuses on "famous 'show trials." R.H. HELmHOLz, Introduction to THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS,
1, 5 (1997). Additionally, Helmholz suggests that Levy's interpretation was a
product of the McCarthy era. See id. According to Helmholz, Levy made a
"Strong argument for the vitality of the privilege as a basic civil liberty. That
approach does not necessarily make for the most accurate history, however."
Id.
25. See RIL Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
The Role of the European IUS Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964 (1990).
Helmholz queried, but did not fully explore, the impact his theory would have
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Studies have built on these findings and have started to examine
the practical implications of the privilege's historical origins.26
In particular, commentators have focused on how the privilege
evolved in criminal trials, and jury trials especially, and became a
fixture of American criminal procedure." How scholars ulti-
mately reconcile these new findings with previously accepted
interpretations will figure prominently into how courts approach
Fifth Amendment cases, and in particular, how they assess the
policies behind the privilege against self-incrimination.
B. THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT
1. Application of the Privilege
Although the Self-Incrimination Clause had been in effect
for more than one hundred years, it was not until 1892 that
courts examined its constitutional basis. In Counselman v.
Hitchcock, the Supreme Court endorsed the Fifth Amendment's
on the broader understanding of the Fifth Amendment: "Whether a more
complete understanding of the privilege's origins has implications for today's
controversies about the scope of the fifth amendment is possible, but by no
means certain. The 'lessons' of legal history are often ambiguous, and so they
prove in this instance.m " Id. at 990; see also M.R.T. Macnair, The Early Devel-
opment of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
66, 67 (1990) (arguing that the privilege developed in English law from the
"common family of European laws and particularly the canon law").
26. See HELMHOLZ, supra note 24, at 5 (stating that a more accurate his-
tory may be "relevant to present-day controversies"); see also Donald Dripps,
Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down
that Wrong Road Again", 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1563 (1996) (critiquing Profes-
sor Amar's approach to Fifth Amendment reform); Helmholz, supra note 25,
at 964-67 (outlining Leonard Levy's account of the origins of the privilege);
John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self,
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1047 (1994) (arguing
that the privilege originated "in the rise of adversary criminal procedure at
the end of the eighteenth century"); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsid-
ering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1086 (1994) (asserting that both John H. Wigmore and
Leonard Levy trace the origin of the privilege to "the legacy of resistance to
the prerogative justice of the Stuart monarchy during the second quarter of
the seventeenth century").
27. See Langbein, supra note 26, at 1068-69 (arguing that the privilege is
a product of the change in criminal procedure as counsel for defense started to
appear at criminal trials); Moglen, supra note 26, at 1087 (challenging the as-
sumptions that privilege greatly aided suspects at trial and that the fifth
amendment was a "final acknowledgment of a long-accepted Tundamental
right'").
28. 142 U.S. 547 (1892), overruled in part by Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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protection against forcing a witness to give self-incriminating
testimony.29 Four years later, the Court narrowed the protec-
tion, holding that a witness could only invoke the privilege for
specific reasons." Testimony that might tend to "disgrace or
expose him to unfavorable comment" did not by itself consti-
tute legitimate grounds for the privilege."
In addition to considering the constitutional basis of the
privilege, the Supreme Court has also examined cases where a
witness may invoke the privilege.32 The language of the Fifth
Amendment states no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."33 The Court clarified the
language of the amendment and has consistently held that the
privilege may be invoked in civil or criminal proceedings. 4 The
key issue is not the nature of the case in which the privilege is
invoked. Instead, the court must determine whether the tes-
timony sought might "tend to subject to criminal responsibility
him who gives it."35
Courts may refuse to apply the privilege against self-
incrimination where statutes allow the court to authorize im-
munity for the witness in a subsequent criminal trial.36 Counsel-
man, the first case to consider an immunity statute, held that
an immunity grant must provide "absolute immunity against
future prosecution for the offense to which the question re-
lates."37 The immunity described by the Court came to be
called transactional immunity because it barred prosecution
for any transaction described in the witness's testimony.38 The
Court limited this interpretation in a 1964 case, Murphy v. Wa-
terfront Commission,39 holding that the courts only had to en-
29. See id. at 586; see also 8 Wigmore, supra note 15, § 2252, at 325-26
(describing Counselman).
30. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595-96 (1896).
31. See id. at 595, 598.
32. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (holding that
the privilege applies to both civil and criminal proceedings).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34- See McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 40; see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S.
70, 84-85 (1973) (holding that a witness can be forced to testify if granted im-
munity sufficient to satisfy the privilege).
35. McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 40.
36. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,586 (1892).
37. Id.
38. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRMNAL PROCEDURE §
8.11(b), at 423 (2d ed. 1992).
39. 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
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sure that a witness's testimony and any fruits from that testimony
could not be used in a criminal trial.4° In a 1972 case, Kastigar
v. United States,4' the Court endorsed Congress's codification of
Murphy, holding that immunity from use and derivative use of
compelled testimony had the same effect as the privilege
against self-incrimination. 42
2. The Privilege in Cases of Foreign Prosecution
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the
question of whether the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies to a fear of foreign prosecution. For example,
although Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation
raised the issue, the Court avoided the underlying constitutional
question.43 The case involved a witness who when subpoenaed
by the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation invoked
his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer
questions concerning organized crime, racketeering, and politi-
cal corruption in New Jersey." Although the Commission
granted him immunity pursuant to New Jersey law, he per-
sisted, arguing that his testimony would subject him to prose-
cution in Canada, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.4 5
The Court stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege "protects
against real dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities"
and found that the information sought would not subject the
defendant to a real danger of foreign incrimination.4 Lower
courts have followed and expanded upon the "real and sub-
stantial" fear of foreign prosecution test articulated in Zi-
40. See id. at 79; see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
The Hoffman court held that the defendant may invoke the privilege because
the testimony would provide a "link in the chain of evidence needed to prose-
cute the claimant for a federal crime." Id. at 486.
41. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
42. See id. at 453.
43. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S.
472 (1972).
44- See id. at 478-79.
45. See id. at 474.
48. See id. at 478. The burden of showing a real danger of foreign prose-
cution rests upon the defendant. See generally Scott Bovino, Comment, A
Systematic Approach to Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Claims When
Foreign Prosecution Is Feared, 60 U. CmH. L. REV. 903 (1993). Bovino argues
that the practical effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant
has been to force defendants to meet a higher standard in self-incrimination
cases involving the potential of foreign prosecution than must be shown in cases
involving potential self-incrimination in domestic courts. See fd. at 909-19.
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carelli.47 Courts will consider such questions as whether there
is an existing prosecution against the witness, the nature of
the charges, the possibility of extradition, and the likelihood
that testimony would be disclosed to a foreign government.48 Most
often the defendant is unable to show a real and substantial
danger of foreign prosecution, and as a result, relatively few
circuit courts have decided the underlying constitutional question.49
Although Zicarelli concerned the Self-Incrimination
Clause and a fear of foreign prosecution, the Court's failure to
address the constitutional issue has forced lower courts finding
a real and substantial risk to analogize to previous Supreme
Court cases. The Court's extension of the Fifth Amendment to
all domestic courts in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission has
proven most analogous to the constitutional question involving
the Self-Incrimination Clause and a fear of foreign prosecution.
In Murphy, two witnesses invoked the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege at a hearing concerning an investigation into a labor dispute
in New Jersey." Although the witnesses were granted immunity
under New York and New Jersey law, they refused to testify,
arguing that their testimony might incriminate them under
federal law, which the immunity grant did not cover." The
Court held that witnesses granted immunity under state law
could not be prosecuted under federal law on the basis of com-
pelled testimony 2
47. United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982), first ex-
panded on the Zicarelli test. Other jurisdictions have adopted the Second
Circuit's approach. See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794
F.2d 920, 923-24 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting the Flanagan court's articulation of
the factors relevant in determining whether a witness faces a cognizable dan-
ger of prosecution).
48. See Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121.
49. See, e.g., In re Gilboe, 699 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a
grant of immunity removed the danger of foreign prosecution); In re Baird,
668 F.2d 432, 433 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that grand jury proceedings pro-
vided adequate secrecy to protect against a real and substantial risk of foreign
prosecution). See generally Diego A. Rotsztain, Note, The Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1940, 1959-71 (1996) (arguing that the "real and substantial"
test is unworkable and leads courts to questionable conclusions).
50. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 53 (1964).
51. See id. at 53-54.
52. See id. at 79-80. The Supreme Court ruled on a second important
Fifth Amendment case on the same day it decided Murphy: Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964). Malloy involved a defendant's assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination in a Connecticut state proceeding. See id. at 3. The
Court held that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Four-
1304 [Vol. 82:1297
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Murphy has become a central case in the debate over the
Self-Incrimination Clause and the potential for foreign prose-
cution because it addressed the policy considerations underlying
the privilege." In language that has since become famous,
Justice Goldberg described the privilege as reflecting "many of
our fundamental values and most noble aspirations," including
"our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."54 In
addition to discussing the privilege's protection against unjust
methods of prosecution," Murphy also emphasized that the
Self-Incrimination Clause preserves an individual's right to be
free from government intrusion. 6 The Court found that there
was a real danger that both the policies and the purpose of the
privilege would be defeated if a witness could be prosecuted in
two different jurisdictions for the same offense.57 Courts denying
the privilege in cases of foreign prosecution have held that
much of Goldberg's language is overbroad dicta. 8 Courts up-
holding the privilege have ruled that Murphy outlined the es-
sential purpose and function of the privilege and should be
followed. 9
In addition to its discussion of the privilege's policy consid-
erations, Murphy also examined the "English rule" regarding
self-incrimination under foreign law.' The Court described
two early English cases that applied the privilege before the
adoption of the Constitution in the United States. In both
these cases, the English courts upheld the defendants' right to
refuse to "discover" certain information that would subject
them to prosecution in Indian and in English ecclesiastical
courts.62 Murphy overruled an earlier case, United States v.
teenth Amendment. See id.
53. See 378 U.S. at 55-57.
54. Id. at 55.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 55-56.
58. See infra Part LC (analyzing decisions that have downplayed Murphy's
precedential value).
59. See infra Part I.D (discussing cases that have relied on the Courtes
reasoning in Murphy).
60. See 378 U.S. at 58-63.
61. See id. at 58-59.
62. See id. The first case, from 1749, East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves.
sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1789), involved a defendant who refused to an-
swer certain questions in an English court because he feared that he would
then be subject to prosecution in India See id. at 58. In the second case, de-
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Murdock, which had held that the "English rule" on the privi-
lege did not protect a witness against self-incrimination under
foreign laws. 3 The Murphy court then examined English law
and found that the "settled 'English rule' regarding self-
incrimination under foreign law" protected against the disclo-
sure of information that would subject the defendant to foreign
prosecution."
C. COURTS DENYING THE PRIVILEGE IN CASES OF FOREIGN
PROSECUTION
Circuit courts are split on whether the Self-Incrimination
Clause can be invoked where there is a risk of foreign prosecu-
tion." The Fourth Circuit has most clearly articulated the rea-
sons for denying the privilege against self-incrimination where the
person fears foreign prosecution. The case concerned a daugh-
ter and son-in-law of former Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos, who refused to testify before a grand jury investigating
corruption charges in the awarding of Philippine arms con-
tracts.' The court first determined that the defendants faced
pending charges in the Philippines that involved a question simi-
cided one year later, Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. sen. 243, 28 Eng. Rep.
157 (1790), the defendant refused to answer questions regarding her marital
status because any admission on her part would have subjected her to prose-
cution in the ecclesiastical courts. See id. at 58-59.
63. See 378 U.S. at 70-72. Murphy found that Murdock had erroneously
cited King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116, as
representing the English rule on self-incrimination under foreign law. See id.
at 60. King of Two Sicilies had been overruled by United States v. McRae, L.
R., 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867). See id. at 61. In McRae, the United States sued for
payment of money received by the defendant who had acted as an agent of the
Confederate States during the Civil War. See id. The McRae court sustained
the claim of privilege and found that the case did not differ from one in which
the witness's testimony would be self-incriminating under domestic law. See
id. at 62-63.
64. See id. at 61-63.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1457 (11th Cir. 1997)
(denying the Fifth Amendment privilege to a suspected Nazi war criminal who
feared prosecution in Israel, Germany, and Lithuania); United States v.
(Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d 920, 923-26 (4th Cir. 1986) (denying the
privilege to two Philippine citizens even though they had demonstrated a real
and substantial risk of prosecution in their home country); In re Parker, 411
F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969) (asserting that the Fifth Amendment should not be
interpreted as applying to criminal acts in a foreign country). But see United
States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 751
(1998) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked
where there is a real and substantial risk that the testimony will be used in
foreign prosecution).
66. See (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d at 921-22.
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lar to the American suit. Thus, there existed a real and sub-
stantial risk of foreign prosecution according to the Supreme
Court's standard in Zicarelli.7 Acknowledging the American
interest in the prosecution of the case in the Philippines, the
court determined that the district court's order limiting disclosure
of grand jury testimony under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 6(e)6" was not adequate to ensure that the defendants' testi-
mony would not be disclosed to the Philippine government. 9
The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants' claim that
they could invoke the Self-Incrimination Clause based on several
related grounds .7  The court noted that the Fifth Amendment
does not affect or prohibit the use of compelled self-
incriminatory evidence by foreign courts.' It held that the Self-
Incrimination Clause only applies where both the sovereign com-
pelling the testimony and the sovereign using the testimony
are controlled by the Fifth Amendment.7 2 The court inter-
preted the Self-Incrimination Clause both to protect individual
dignity and to preserve the accusatorial nature of the American
criminal justice system.73 It asserted that its ruling would pre-
serve those values, as well as those articulated by the Supreme
Court in Murphy.7 4 The court suggested that the primary pol-
67. See id. at 923-24.
68. Rule 6(e) protects against the disclosure of grand jury testimony. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
69. See 794 F.2d at 925. Courts have gone both ways on whether Rule
6(e) provides adequate protection to the witness. See, e.g., In re Baird, 668
F.2d 432, 433 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule 6(e) adequately protected a
witness from prosecution in Canada on drug-related charges); In re Tierney,
465 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding that Rule 6(e)'s provision for secrecy
removed the possibility of prosecution in Great Britain); Parker, 411 F.2d at
1069 (holding that Rule 6(e) is a sufficient guarantee against disclosure of
testimony). But see, e.g., (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d at 925 (finding that
'the Rule 6(e) order is not adequate to ensure that the testimony of the
Aranetas will not be disclosed to the Philippine government"); United States
v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1982) (suggesting that there might be
cases in which "grand jurors might consciously or inadvertently leak confi-
dential information").
The Rule 6(e) protection against disclosure is particularly inadequate in
many cases now in the courts involving deportation proceedings against resi-
dent aliens and citizens suspected of being Nazi collaborators during World
War 11. See infra note 81 (describing the OSrs activities and its broad powers
to disclose evidence to foreign countries).
70. See (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d at 925-28.
71 See id. at 925.
72. See id. at 926.
73. See id.
74. See id. Although the court followed Murphy's interpretation of the
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icy consideration behind its decision was that "our own na-
tional sovereignty would be compromised if our system of
criminal justice were made to depend on the actions of foreign
government [sic] beyond our control."75
Other lower courts have also found that the privilege
against self-incrimination does not protect witnesses fearing
foreign prosecution. 6 One district court attempted to find a
compromise between a strict denial or acceptance of the privi-
lege by weighing the government's purpose and need for com-
pelling the testimony against the witness's basis for claiming
the privilege.77 In that case, however, the defendant's interest
did not outweigh the United States' "legitimate need" for the
testimony. 8
meaning of the Fifth Amendment, it went to great lengths to distinguish
Murphy. Noting that "[the [Murphy] Coures scholarship with respect to the
English law in this regard has been attacked," the court in (Under Seal)
(Araneta) concluded that the holding in Murphy did not hinge on the correct-
ness of the Court's understanding of English law. See id. at 927. This inter-
pretation allowed the Fourth Circuit to dismiss the precedential influence of
Murphy and hold that the question of the applicability of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege in cases involving a fear of foreign prosecution remained open.
See id.
75. Id. at 926. The court further stated, "It would be intolerable to re-
quire the United States to forego evidence legitimately within its reach solely
because a foreign power could deploy this evidence in a fashion not permitted
within this country." Id.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Lileilds, 899 F. Supp. 802, 809 (D. Mass.
1995) ("If a governmental interest in enforcing the organic laws of the United
States is involved, and the United States has a legitimate need for a witness's
testimony in furthering that interest, the privilege must yield if the sole basis
for claiming its protections is the fact that a resident of the United States
faces the likelihood of a foreign prosecution."); Phoenix Assurance Co. of Can.
v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402, 411 (N.D. 1982) ("The absence of any reference to
any foreign law in whatever form is an indication that the fifth amendment
was designed to apply only to the laws of the United States and was not in-
tended to embrace foreign prosecution."). The court in Phoenix concluded that
application of the privilege could not be carried outside the American, federal-
state system, and suggested that the best resolution to this difficult question
lay in multilateral treaties between countries. See id. at 411-13.
77. See Lileikis, 899 F. Supp at 808-09 (stating that "a court entreated to
exercise its contempt power is obligated to examine the government's purpose
and need in seeking to compel a witness's testimony").
78. Id. at 809. The court in Lileikis subscribed to the policy argument
laid out in (Under Seal) (Araneta), asserting that "ilt would be an unaccept-
able affront to the sovereignty of the United States if the operation of its laws
could be stymied by the desire of a foreign government to prosecute the same
witness." Id. However, the court qualified this statement by saying the gov-
ernment "should not bend the Constitution solely to promote the foreign pol-
icy objectives of the executive branch, however laudable," by forcing a witness
to testify in a proceeding "that does not have as its fundamental purpose the
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D. COURTS RECOGNIZING THE PRIVILEGE IN CASES
OF FOREIGN PROSECUTION
The Second Circuit and a number of district courts have
held that the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked
where there is a real and substantial risk that the testimony
would be used in foreign prosecution. 9 United States v. Balsys0
presented the Second Circuit with facts very similar to the Gecas
case. The United States government, through the OSI,8' brought
suit to enforce a subpoena issued against a resident alien to de-
termine whether he lied on his immigration application regarding
his activities during World War H.82
The Second Circuit first noted that there is nothing in the
language of the Fifth Amendment to suggest that there should be
a distinction between the application of the privilege in domestic
or foreign settings.83 Recognizing the controversial nature of
the origins of the Fifth Amendment, the court relied on Murphy."
Based on Murphy, the court found that the Fifth Amendment
"advances individual integrity and privacy, it protects against the
state's pursuit of its goals by excessive means, and it promotes
vindication of the domestic laws of the United States." Id.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 751 (1998) (upholding the privilege); Moses v. Allard,
779 F. Supp. 857, 883 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (refusing in a domestic bankruptcy
proceeding to force the testimony of a debtor who feared prosecution in Swit-
zerland); In re Flanagan, 533 F. Supp. 957, 966 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that
the privilege could be invoked because of a fear of foreign prosecution), rev'd
on other grounds, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982); Mishima v. United States, 507
F. Supp. 131, 134-35 (D. Alaska 1981) (relying on the analysis of the English
rule in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n to find that the privilege could be in-
yoked by a defendant who feared prosecution in Japan).
80. 119 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1997).
81. The United States government created the OSI in 1979 to seek out
and initiate removal proceedings against immigrants found guilty of persecut-
ing people during World War 11 based on their race, religion, ethnic origin, or
political views. See Frank J. Murray, Nazi-Hunters Race the Grim Reaper for
Aging Prey, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1997, at Al. Since its formation, the OSI
has brought cases against 103 alleged Nazi collaborators. See id. Of those, 60
citizens have been denaturalized and 48 have been deported. See id. The OSI
currently has 17 cases in court and 281 active investigations underway. See
id. The government has given the OSI broad powers to investigate these
cases. As part of its mandate, the OSI is to "[mlaintain liaison with foreign
prosecution, investigation and intelligence offices" and collect and share evi-
dence with foreign governments in their prosecution of the cases. Balsys, 119
F.3d at 125 (citation omitted).
82. See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 124-25.
83. See id. at 126.
84. See id. at 129.
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the systemic values of our method of criminal justice."11 The court
then held that allowing the privilege in the case of potential
foreign prosecution did not interfere with these basic values.86
It interpreted the Supreme Court's reading of the "English
rule" concerning the privilege in Murphy to lend support to its
holding. 7 Finally, the court rejected the notion that applica-
tion of the privilege to the fear of foreign prosecution would
hinder domestic law enforcement, asserting that these argu-
ments had no constitutional basis.88 Several district courts
applying the privilege have seized on the specific language
from Murphy, finding that the privilege represents multiple
policy considerations such that a denial of the privilege in foreign
prosecution would frustrate the Fifth Amendment's purpose.89
The lack of legislative history accompanying the Fifth
Amendment,90 the disagreement among scholars as to the
meaning of the privilege against self-incrimination, 9' and the
85. Id.
86. See id. at 130-31. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the risk of
intrusive investigative techniques was miniTied when the compelling juris-
diction did not intend to prosecute the witness. See id. at 130. It reasoned,
though, that international collaboration in law enforcement had created a
situation analogous to the cooperation between state and federal law enforce-
ment officials in the United States, and pointed out that American govern-
mental interests in compelling testimony are likely to be most pressing in
cases where the witness faces the greatest risk of foreign prosecution. See id.
at 130-31.
87. See id. at 133.
88. See id. at 134. The court quoted In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080,
1086 (D. Conn. 1972), which found that
a constitutional privilege does not disappear, nor even lose its normal
vitality, simply because its use may hinder law enforcement activi-
ties. That is a consequence of nearly all the protections of the Bill of
Rights, and a consequence that was originally and ever since deemed
justified by the need to protect individual rights.
119 F.3d at 134.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Ragauskas, No. 94 C 2325, 1995 WL 86640,
at *5 (N.D. IlI. Feb. 27, 1995) (holding that the Fifth Amendment not only pro-
tects against government conduct but is also a "personal right"); Moses v. Al-
lard, 799 F. Supp. 857, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (refusing to assign a single pur-
pose to the privilege); United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (E.D. Pa.
1981) ("[The privilege is not simply a limit on the activities of American
courts and law-enforcement authorities: it is a freedom conferred upon per-
sons within the protection of American law.").
90. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
behind the lack of legislative history).
91. See supra Part IA (tracing the development of the competing inter-
pretations of the Fifth Amendment).
[Vol. 82:12971310
1998] FIFTH AMENDMENT & FOREIGN PROSECUTION 1311
lack of controlling precedent92 all contribute to a wide split
among courts on the issue of the privilege in the context of foreign
prosecution. These factors, in addition to the increasingly
transnational nature of legal disputes," make this issue vital
and situate United States v. Gecas at the center of an impor-
tant and complicated legal debate.
H. UNITED STATES V. GECAS
In the face of split decisions between the circuit and dis-
trict courts, the Eleventh Circuit squarely held in United
States v. Gecas that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not apply even where the defendant faces a real and sub-
stantial likelihood of prosecution in a foreign country 4 Following
the Zicarelli test95 the court considered whether Gecas would
be subject to prosecution in a foreign country. 6 The court
found that if Gecas were forced to answer the questions, the in-
formation revealed would incriminate him under Israeli, Ger-
man, and Lithuanian law.97 Thus, based on the reach of the
foreign laws, the likelihood that Gecas's testimony would be
transferred to foreign countries, and the probability of deportation
or extradition,98 the court found that Gecas faced a "real, sub-
stantial, reasonable, and appreciable fear of foreign conviction.""
Upon finding that Gecas met the threshold question, the
court turned to the underlying constitutional issue. The court
determined that the applicability of the privilege to Gecas's
case turned on whether his deportation proceeding qualified as
a "criminal case" under the language of the Fifth Amend-
92. See supra text accompanying note 43 (noting that the Supreme Court
did not address the constitutional question in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State
Commission of Investigation).
93. See supra note 81 (describing how the OSI will likely generate other
cases involving questions similar to those addressed here).
94. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1457 (11th Cir. 1997).
95. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (describing the expan-
sion of Zicarelli's threshold test).
96. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1424-27.
97. See id. at 1425. The court found that both Israel and Lithuania had
laws relating specifically to the prosecution of Nazi collaborators and perpe-
trators of genocide. See id. at 1424-25.
98. The court described the aggressive role played by the Justice Depart-
ment's OSI in pursuing the denaturalization and deportation of suspected
Nazi war criminals. It noted that the "OSI exists to expel war criminals from
the United States" and that it maintains contacts with foreign prosecutors in
order to aid in the indictment of expelled war criminals. Id. at 1426.
99. Id. at 1427.
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ment.° The court cited two Supreme Court cases, Kastigar v.
United States'0' and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez'02 to
support its finding that the privilege only protects against the
"infliction of criminal penalties.""3 Thus, a violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause can only occur at the witness's own
criminal trial when the testimony is actually used, not during
the compulsion of the testimony.' The Gecas court then held
that neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other procedural
protections afforded by the Constitution apply to judicial pro-
ceedings outside of the United States.' Foreign countries
cannot violate the Fifth Amendment when they prosecute de-
fendants based on compelled evidence produced in the United
States.'06 Thus, the Gecas court reasoned that a proceeding
only becomes a "criminal case" when there exists the possibility of
conviction in a jurisdiction subject to the Fifth Amendment.0 7
To support its interpretation, the Gecas court dismissed
Murphy's discussion of the English cases, cited by Murphy to
represent the "English rule" on the privilege against self-
incrimination."'8 The Gecas court also rejected Gecas's alter-
100. See id. The court noted that according to the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation the privilege may be invoked when a witness faced a "legitimate
possibility" of conviction in any proceeding. See id. at 1428. Thus, a deporta-
tion proceeding could qualify as a criminal case if there existed the threat of
conviction. See id.
101. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Kastigar held that grants of immunity must be
coextensive with the scope of the privilege in order to compel testimony over a
claim of the privilege. See id. at 453.
102. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). Verdugo-Urquidez examined whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to the search by American authorities of the Mexican
residence of a Mexican citizen and resident. It referred to the privilege
against self-incrimination by briefly noting the difference in application be-
tween the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. See id. at 264.
103. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1428.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1430. The Gecas court returned to this point when it at-
tempted to undermine the defendant's reliance on Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission. See id. at 1431. Gecas had relied on Murphy in arguing that the
critical question was whether the government compelling the testimony pro-
tects against self-incrimination. See id. The court ruled that Murphy could
only be understood in the context of Malloy v. Hogan, decided on the same day
as Murphy. See id. at 1431. The Gecas court argued that these cases together
show that both the jurisdiction compelling the testimony and the jurisdiction
using the testimony have to be bound by the privilege against self-
incrimination. See id. at 1431-32.
106. See id. at 1430.
107. See id. at 1432-33.
108. See id; supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Eng-
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native claim that the OSrs methods of prosecution and its close
connections with the foreign governments transformed these
governments into agents of the United States, thus making the
United States both the compelling and the using sovereign.' °9
The court further supported its decision by noting that if the
privilege against self-incrimination were applied to foreign
convictions, suspected criminals could easily subvert American
law enforcement efforts.'10
Relying on academic scholarship, the Gecas court ventured
into a lengthy and detailed exposition on the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination.' The court traced the
origins of the privilege from medieval ecclesiastical and secular
courts ' 2 to the advent of the first jury trials in the thirteenth
century."'3 It then noted the formal establishment of the privi-
lege in seventeenth century England"' and discussed its adoption
by the American colonies, then its inclusion in the Bill of
lish cases cited in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission). The Gecas court dis-
tinguished the two English cases that predated the Constitution by interpret-
ing that the cases stood for the principle that the privilege against self-
incrimination applied in Indian and ecclesiastical courts because both fell
within the English sovereignty. See 120 F.3d at 1432-33. Finally, it held that
although Murphy clearly endorsed McRae as the English rule, Parliament
overruled the case four years after Murphy. See id. at 1433. Thus, it held
that "[wie decline to rely on a foreign case that has been overruled." Id.
109. See 120 F.3d at 1433-34.
110. See id. at 1434. The court suggested possible problems if it were to
allow the privilege. For example, if a person flying from another country were
arrested in an American airport for smuggling drugs, that person could refuse
to testify, even in exchange for immunity for information about a drug
smuggling operation in the United States because that testimony could be
used to prosecute that person in a foreign country. See id.
111 See id. at 1435-57. The court recognized the vast scope of the privi-
lege's historical account by noting that this "undertaking will fill a few more
pages of the federal reporter than we might otherwise wish, but we consider a
full understanding of the privilege essential to the resolution of the important
issue presented in this case." Id at 1435. Indeed, the court's historical dis-
cussion alone occupied 22 pages of the Federal Reporter.
112. See id. at 1436-40.
113. See id. at 1440-41.
114. See id. at 1449. The court noted the influence of seventeenth-century
English Puritans who protested against the secular and ecclesiastical courts'
inquisitorial methods. The Gecas court acknowledged that these protesters
described the courts' interrogatory methods as a violation of natural law, but
characterized these claims as attempts to "interpose as many procedural ob-
jections as possible to their prosecution." Id. at 1448-49. By the mid-1600s
century, several tracts condemning the courts' arbitrary exercise of power had
become so widely read that in 1641, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial
methods of the courts and instituted a statutory privilege against self-
incrimination. See id. at 1450.
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Rights by the Framers."5  Based on this history, the Gecas
court rejected Gecas's claim that the privilege was meant to
protect individual privacy and dignity."6 Instead, the court
concluded that the purpose of the privilege was to limit the in-
vestigative techniques of an overreaching government." 7
The dissent strongly criticized the majority opinion on several
grounds."8 It argued that denying the privilege to a witness
who had a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution defeated the
policies underlying the privilege." 9 The dissent also argued
that the majority misinterpreted the Supreme Court cases on
the privilege. 20 Finally, the dissent noted that the majority's
115. See id. at 1456. The court believed that the colonists "viewed the
privilege against self-incrimination as a bulwark against arbitrary and intrusive
criminal investigations." Id. at 1457.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1456. In a footnote, the court addressed the dissent's con-
tention that the privilege espoused both personal liberty and a limit on gov-
ernment. The court found that the "individual dignity of criminal defendants
is secured by limiting the nature of the federal government's prosecutorial
techniques." Id. at 1457 n.36. The majority argued that the dissent created
support for its opinion by "splitting this unified policy into separate policies,
then finding the one which suits the occasion." Id.
118. See id. at 1458-83 (Birch, J., dissenting). The alignment of opinions
demonstrates the contentious and difficult nature of this issue. Six judges
found there to be no privilege. Of these, one judge concurred in a separate
opinion. Among the five dissenting judges, one dissented with a separate
opinion. In his separate dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Carnes argued that
the Department of Justice had been acting as an "'alter ego'" of foreign prose-
cutors in the Gecas case. As evidence, the judge offered a sealed opinion from
the Ninth Circuit in a case similar to Gecas. See id. at 1484.
119. See id. at 1459. The dissent argued that Murphy explicitly identified
two policies behind the privilege. See id. at 1460. The privilege was meant to
ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system by placing limits on the
prosecutor's techniques, and to protect the individual's privacy and freedom
from cruelty. See id. The dissent also took issue with the majority's assertion
that the privilege only protected against use of compelled testimony, not the
actual compulsion. See id. at 1461. It argued that the "prohibition against
use alone.., does not promote, and in fact defeats, the rights-based rationale
of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
120. See id at 1461-64 (Birch, J., dissenting). The dissent examined Supreme
Court cases interpreting the grant of immunity and asserted that these cases
demonstrate that when a witness is granted use and derivative use immunity,
the privilege against self-incrimination no longer applies. This means that
the central issue is not whether the court using the compelled testimony is
within the same jurisdiction, but whether the testimony can be used in any
criminal prosecution of the witness. See id. at 1463. The dissent also inter-
preted Murphy and asserted that "only a strained reading of the Court's
opinion and wholesale discounting of the reasoning embodied in it could lead
one to reach the conclusion of the majority in this case." Id. at 1472.
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historical account of the privilege was selective and contra-
dicted by the Supreme Court's discussion of the subject.121
III. GECAS: A CLEAR, BUT UNSUPPORTED HOLDING
United States v. Gecas articulates a clear holding as to the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination where the
witness faces a substantial fear of foreign prosecution. Although
the decision is a laudable attempt to analogize to Supreme
Court precedent and to unify a diverse and complex historical
literature, the court's approach is flawed in several respects.
The Gecas court misreads the two components of the privilege
and ignores the multiple rationales behind the privilege. Fu-
ture courts should read the language of the Fifth Amendment
broadly and apply the privilege in cases where there is a real
and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.
A. LOCATING THE VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Gecas court's interpretation of a "criminal case" under
the Fifth Amendment is central to its holding that the privilege
cannot be invoked in the context of cases of potential foreign
prosecution.'" The court finds that, "[t]he actual violation, if
any, occurs only at a witness's own criminal trial."12 Because
the criminal trial will occur in a foreign country not bound by
the U.S. Constitution, there can be no violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Thus, Gecas's claim is not a "criminal case." 24
At first glance, the court's argument is convincing. Closer
inspection reveals, however, that it rests on an unstable foun-
dation. The key to the court's approach is the assertion that
the privilege against self-incrimination is basically a tool to
protect against the use of compelled evidence at trial. It ac-
knowledges that in addition to a witness's right to invoke the
121. See id. at 1472-78. The dissent acknowledged that one of the primary
rationales of the privilege was to protect against an overzealous prosecuting
government, but it argued that a rights-based rationale is consistent and
complements the structural rationale. See id. at 1472. To this end, the dis-
sent asserted that the majority de-emphasized and ignored key elements of
the privilege's history, which suggest that the privilege derived its origin from
natural law. See id at 1473. Finally, the dissent critiqued the majority opinion
for its discussion of the practical considerations applying the privilege to cases
involving potential criminal prosecution in a foreign country. See id at 1478-82.
122. See id. at 1427.
123. Id. at 1428.
124. Id. at 1430-31.
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privilege at trial, the witness can also invoke the privilege to
prevent compulsion of self-incriminating testimony.I" How-
ever, the court is quick to minimize the importance of the ap-
plication of the privilege prior to testimony.'26 Calling this as-
pect of the privilege a "prophylactic rule," the court reiterates
its basic assumption that "[tlhe Self-Incrimination Clause pro-
tects against conviction based on self-incrimination; it does not
protect against the mere compulsion of testimony by a court." 27
The Gecas court's argument fails because it denies the estab-
lished and constitutionally authorized use of the privilege to
protect against compulsion of self-incriminating evidence.
1. The Privilege's Protection Against Conviction:
Making Dicta Bind
The court categorically dismisses Gecas's claim based on
an unsupported citation to one Supreme Court case, Kastigar
v. United States 8 and dicta from another, United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez.29 The Gecas court cites Kastigar to show
that the privilege only protects against the "actual 'infliction of
criminal penalties on the witness.'" '3 The Gecas court both
takes the Kastigar quote out of context and mischaracterizes
its meaning. Kastigar did not narrow the reach of the privilege
as Gecas suggests. It held that a grant of immunity must be
coextensive with the scope of the privilege. 3' This means that
an immunity grant must be broad enough to protect against
compulsion of testimony that would lead to or could be used in
a criminal trial. Implicit in its holding is the constitutional
right to invoke the privilege to prevent against self-
incriminating testimony. Gecas incorrectly characterizes tes-
timony, which would create the possibility of conviction, as falling
outside the reach of the privilege.
Although the Supreme Court has endorsed grants of im-
munity based on use and derivative use of the testimony, it has
been careful not to circumscribe the privilege. In Hoffman v.
United States,' the Court held that the defendant could not be
125. See id. at 1428-29.
126. See id. at 1429 n.13.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See id. at 1428.
129. See id. at 1428, 1432.
130. Id. at 1428.
131. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
132. 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951).
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forced to answer questions because "it was not 'perfectly clear,
from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the
case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot
possibly have such tendency' to incriminate."' Also, in
Lefkowitz v. Turley, decided one year after Kastigar, the Su-
preme Court again clearly stated that in cases where the tes-
timony may be self-incriminating, a grant of immunity will
only satisfy the privilege if the witness is fully protected
against the use of the testimony.'34 Aside from the isolated cita-
tion to Kastigar, nowhere has the Supreme Court conditioned
the privilege upon the witness's conviction at trial.
The Gecas court supports its reading of Kastigar by citing
an unrelated case, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.13 5 Gecas
argues that Verdugo-Urquidez stands for the proposition that
privilege can only be violated at trial, not at the compulsion of
the evidence.'36 However, Verdugo-Urquidez addressed the is-
sue of whether the Fourth Amendment applies to American
authorities' search and seizure of property belonging to a nonresi-
dent alien in a foreign country.' 37 The Supreme Court discussed
the privilege against self-incrimination only to demonstrate the
difference in operation between the two amendments.'38 As the
dissent in Gecas aptly noted, Verdugo-Urquidez's mention of
the privilege occurs in the three introductory sentences of the
opinion.'39 The dissent argued that the discussion was "not
only dicta, but also merely passing dicta that provides no use-
ful analysis whatsoever."'1 Neither Kastigar nor Verdugo-
Urquidez provide adequate support to dismiss outright the
witness's right to the privilege where there is a danger of a
foreign prosecution. By relying on these cases, Gecas focuses
only on criminal conviction and fails to address the constitu-
tional protection against the use of the testimony in a criminal
trial and the potential violation that occurs at compulsion.
Once the court establishes this narrow interpretation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, it can fall back on the argument
133. Id. at 488 (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (Va.
1881)).
134. See 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973).
135. 494 U.S. 259, 259 (1990).
136. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1428.
137. See 494 U.S. at 259.
138. See id. at 264.
139. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1468 n.59 (Birch, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Birch, J., dissenting).
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that because Gecas's criminal conviction can only occur in a
foreign country, beyond the jurisdiction of the United States,
there can be no constitutional violation.
2. The Privilege's Dual Components:
Before Testimony and During Trial
Not only does the Gecas court misread Supreme Court
precedent on the application of the privilege beyond criminal
cases, it ignores the constitutional basis of the protection
against being forced to testify. The Supreme Court's consistent
rulings on the proper scope of immunity statutes' and the
early application of the privilege414 undermine the Gecas court's
argument.
Gecas notes the alternatives facing a court when a witness
invokes the privilege: it may deny a motion to compel a witness
to testify or exclude improperly compelled evidence.43 To support
its assertion that the exclusion of compelled testimony is the
only necessary element of the privilege, the court describes the
refusal to compel testimony as a "prophylactic rule."' The Ge-
cas court mistakenly bases this analysis on the fact that if the
witness is granted immunity, the court in a criminal case will
be forced to "launder its case," excluding potentially incrimi-
nating testimony.'45 As the dissent notes, the description of
this aspect of the privilege as prophylactic incorrectly analogizes
to the Supreme Court's rulings on the Miranda warnings.'"
The court's dismissal of the protection against compulsion
is untenable because it denies repeated rulings by the Supreme
Court that testimony cannot be compelled over a valid assertion of
the privilege. 47 Beginning with Counselman and continuing
through Kastigar, the Court has forced witnesses to testify only
where the grant of immunity protects the witness from prose-
cution based on the use of the testimony and any evidence de-
14L See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
143. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1428-29.
144. Id. at 1429.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1464 (Birch, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that the
Court recognized the Miranda warnings as prophylactic because they are not
rights that are themselves protected by the Constitution. Instead, the warn-
ings are meant to ensure that the right to the privilege is protected. See id.
147. See supra notes 29-31, 36-42 and accompanying text.
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rived from it.'48 If the privilege were truly a prophylactic rule
as Gecas suggests, what explains the Supreme Court's consis-
tent rulings on immunity statutes? Gecas does not offer any
resolution to the fundamental contradiction of what purpose
the immunity statutes serve, if not to protect a Constitutional
right. According to Gecas's interpretation, a court faced with a
witness invoking the privilege would never have to grant im-
munity. The court could simply force every witness to testify,
no matter the content of the testimony or its possible use at a
criminal trial. Alternatively, the court could mechanically
grant immunity to the witness and not concern itself with the
appropriateness of the grant, relative to the testimony. The
only time a court need concern itself with the question of allow-
ing compelled testimony is at the criminal trial, when, accord-
ing to Gecas, the privilege is at stake. As tempting as the Gecas
approach sounds, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the
privilege protects against both the compulsion and introduction
of self-incriminating evidence.'49 The privilege's protection
against compulsion is not just an extension of the protection
against use of compelled testimony, as Gecas seems to sug-
gest-it is in itself, a constitutional right.
The importance of the privilege's protection against com-
pulsion is further supported when the privilege is put in the
context of its early American application. The debate over the
proper scope of the privilege in modern criminal procedure has
illuminated the privilege's early protection.' ° The thrust of the
privilege in eighteenth century America focused on the privi-
lege's protection before the testimony had been compelled from
the witness.' As one scholar has put it, "courts did not compel
testimony first, and ask what use if any could be made of it
later. Rather, they insisted that the privilege holder use it or
lose it."5 2 The historical emphasis on the invocation of the
privilege before the testimony is compelled, seriously weakens
one of Gecas's fundamental assumptions. Not only is the
148. See supra Part I.B.1.
149. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
151. See Dripps, supra note 26, at 1625-26 (analyzing the development of
the privilege in early American law).
152. Dripps, supra note 26, at 1625. Professor Dripps cites early civil
cases where the court upheld the witness's refusal to testify and Blackstone's
influential law treatises, which constituted a "primary source of legal knowl-
edge for the framers," to support his proposition that the witness had to in-
yoke the privilege or lose it. Id. at 1625-26.
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court's interpretation suspect with regard to the question of
when a violation of the privilege occurs, but it is contradicted
by consistent Supreme Court holdings and by the historical
context of the privilege. Both these factors emphasize the privi-
lege's protection against compulsion of testimony. Thus, these
factors by themselves compel a broader interpretation of the
privilege.
B. FINDING A WAY AROUND MURPHYAND HISTORY
The Gecas holding that the privilege cannot be asserted
because there can be no Constitutional violation under foreign
law is powerful because it rejects all Fifth Amendment claims
involving questions of foreign prosecution. To support its
holding, the court attempts to distinguish Murphy v. Water-
front Commission'53 and to read a single purpose into the his-
tory of the privilege.
1. Distinguishing English Law
To distinguish Murphy, the court first found that its holding
could not be separated out of the context of another case, Mal-
loy v. Hogan, which applied the privilege against self-
incrimination to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'5 4 Then the Gecas court found
that the English cases cited by the Supreme Court either did
not involve two strictly separate jurisdictions'55 or had been
overruled by the English Parliament.'56
The Gecas court makes much of the fact that the Supreme
Court decided Murphy and Malloy on the same day. Instead of
viewing the cases as treating two distinct, but related issues,
Gecas treats Murphy as simply an amplified version of Malloy.
According to Gecas, the Supreme Court "chose Murphy as a
vehicle for unifying the meaning of the privilege against self-
incrimination within the United States."'57 As support, the Gecas
court notes citations by both Murphy and Malloy to each
153. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Murphy.
154. See supra note 105.
155. See supra note 108 (describing the way Gecas distinguished the Eng-
lish cases).
156. See supra note 108 (citing the Gecas finding that because the English
Parliament later overruled United States v. McRae, it did not constitute rele-
vant precedent).
157. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1431 (11th Cir. 1997).
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other.'58 The Gecas court argues that because of this connec-
tion between the cases, Murphy stands for the proposition that
the Self-Incrimination Clause applies when the compelling and
using courts are within the same jurisdiction."9 Linking Murphy
and Malloy is clever because its leads back to already-trod ground:
Does a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination occur
upon the compulsion or use of the testimony?"6 Although this
approach supports the court's ruling on the inapplicability of
the privilege to cases involving foreign prosecution, it fails to
address Murphy's holding.
The Gecas court further argues that Murphy's citation of
several English cases and its endorsement of the "English rule" is
distinguishable and not binding.161 Gecas attempts to distinguish
the English cases, which concerned the applicability of the
privilege to witnesses fearing prosecution in English ecclesiastical
and Indian courts.62 The Gecas court argued that because India
was an English colony at the time and because the ecclesiastical
court was also in England, the cases stand for the proposition
that "different court systems operating under the same sover-
eign power must abide by the same procedural constraints." 63
Gecas also distinguished United States v. McRae,'64 one of the
English cases cited by Murphy, to represent the English posi-
tion on the privilege against self-incrimination under foreign
law.161 McRae held that where a witness is subject to foreign
prosecution the privilege applies just as it would under English
law.'6 Gecas dismissed Murphy's citation of this case based on
the fact Parliament overruled McRae four years after its deci-
sion, noting that "we decline to rely on a foreign case that has
been overruled."' 67
The court's dismissal of Murphy's citation to the English
cases is suspect for several reasons. A Michigan district court
faced with similar arguments as those made by the Gecas court
158. See id. at 1431-32.
159. See id. at 1432.
160. See supra Part HIA (analyzing Gecas's argument concerning when a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination occurs).
161. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1433.
162. See supra note 62 (discussing the English cases cited by Murphy).
163. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1433.
164. See supra note 63 (describing Murphy's discussion of McRae and the
earlier, overruled case, King of Two Sicilies).
165. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 61-63 (1964).
166. See id.
167. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1433.
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reviewed the English cases and found that the English courts
viewed the ecclesiastical and Indian courts as "distinct and in-
dependent entities" and that the holdings from these cases
"expanded the privilege to prosecutions conducted in non-
domestic jurisdictions."'68 Secondly, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, both the Second Circuit 69 and the Gecas dissent make
the point that it is less important whether Murphy accurately
interpreted English law than it is how Murphy viewed these
cases. 70 On this issue there is no question. Murphy overruled
an early American case that it found had incorrectly stated
English law and instead held that McRae represented the
"settled 'English rule' regarding self-incrimination under for-
eign law."1 1 Gecas's reliance upon it skirts the central issue
that the Supreme Court clearly suggested that a witness could
invoke the privilege to protect against foreign prosecution
based on the testimony.
2. Side-Stepping Murphy
Noticeably absent from the Gecas court's analysis is any
discussion of Murphy's often-cited language describing the
policies and the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination. This omission is exceptional because Murphy is
the most relevant and binding authority on the privilege's policy. 72
The Gecas court's failure to examine this aspect of Murphy is
also noteworthy because Gecas's discussion of the history and
the purpose of the privilege is otherwise so long and exhaus-
tive. 173
Murphy broadly and eloquently sketched the policies be-
hind the privilege against self-incrimination. 174 Among courts
considering application of the privilege in cases where a wit-
ness faces potential foreign prosecution, Gecas stands virtually
alone in neglecting Murphy's relevance in determining the
privilege's rationale. 75 Murphy's language is at the center of a
168. Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 876 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
169. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 133 n.7 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 751 (1998).
170. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1469.
171. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 63.
172. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
175. Although the Second and Fourth Circuits came to different holdings,
both acknowledged Murphy's importance in determining the policies behind
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debate over whether the privilege against self-incrimination
protects against the government's potential abuse of a witness
in extracting testimony, or whether the privilege ensures a per-
sonal right not to incriminate himself.
Influenced both by Murphy and by historical considerations,
courts have generally avoided assigning a single, overriding
policy to the privilege. 6 As the district court in Moses v. Allard
stated, "the Fifth Amendment privilege is not easily reduced to
a singular policy or purpose, but is ephemeral and eludes crisp
summarization. That the privilege is not easily packaged into
one clearly formed policy rationale is a testament to its pro-
found relationship to many of our most cherished ideals."177
Murphy also recognized the pitfalls of forcing the privilege into
a neat category.'78 The Murphy court stated that "it will not do,
therefore, to assign one isolated policy to the privilege."'79 Even
the Fourth Circuit, which held that the privilege does not apply
in cases of foreign prosecution, found that the privilege, "serves
a dual purpose. It protects individual dignity and conscience,
and it preserves the accusatorial nature of our system of crimi-
nal justice."8'
Despite an impressive body of courts, from the Supreme
Court to district courts, which have avoided pinpointing one
policy rationale behind the privilege, the Gecas court insisted
that the privilege was only intended as a limit on the investi-
gative techniques of the government.'8 ' The Second Circuit, in
a case very similar to Gecas, overruled the district court's sin-
gular interpretation of the privilege. 82 It suggested that rather
than, "attempt to determine a single cardinal purpose of the
Fifth Amendment and consider the question before us only in
relation to that purpose, as the district court essentially did,
we are bound to recognize the multiple values that the Su-
preme Court has found the privilege against self-incrimination
the privilege. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 129-130 (2d Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 751 (1998); United States v. (Under Seal)
(Araneta) 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1986).
176. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
177. Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 873 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
178. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964).
179. Id.
180. United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir.
1986).
181. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
182. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 751 (1998).
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to serve.""3 The Gecas court did almost exactly what the Second
Circuit cautioned against: interpret the privilege according to a
predetermined range of answers.
The reason Gecas excludes other possible rationales is that
it first proceeds by categorically ruling that cases involving a
potential foreign prosecution do not qualify as criminal cases
under the Self-Incrimination Clause.' This holding compels
the court to find that the privilege only protects against intru-
sive government investigations. A finding that the privilege
also encompasses a personal right would be at odds with the
court's bright-line rule about the reach of the privilege. Thus,
the Gecas court did not need to consider Murphy's analysis of
the policy question; it had already found the answer.
3. Reading History One-Way
The court's lengthy section on the historical origins of the
privilege is instructive in that it shows how narrowly the court
limited the range of potential rationales it might find. Sweeping
across centuries of diverse and complex history, the court
summarizes the development of the privilege against self-
incrimination with abandon.'85 The court's foray into history is
remarkably ambitious. It notes that no other court has ex-
haustively examined the privilege's history with regard to self-
incrimination under foreign law.'86 By piecing together the
starts and fits that have characterized the privilege's develop-
ment, the court arrives at early American criminal procedure
and confidently states that the Framers did not include the
privilege to protect an individual right, but to limit the gov-
ernment's power to use intrusive investigations to extract tes-
timony.'87
The noteworthy aspect of the court's historical analysis is
not its conclusion, but its confidence in excluding other rationales
represented by the privilege. The historical interpretation of
the privilege among scholars is by no means settled.' 8  A recent
anthology on the privilege asserted that the Self-Incrimination
Clause "continues to produce hotly contested cases in the courts,
183. Id. at 129.
184. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1427-31.
185. See id. at 1435-57.
186. See id. at 1435.
187. See id. at 1457.
188. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text (discussing the debate
among scholars as to the meaning of the privilege).
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a disputatious literature in the law reviews, and strong reac-
tions-indignant, laudatory, and puzzled-among informed ob-
servers."89 In all its citations to law treatises and law review
articles, the court does not hint at the general consternation,
readily acknowledged by scholars, about the meaning and
scope of the privilege.
Gecas's historical discussion makes sense once it is put in
context with the rest of the opinion. The court's entire argument
is driven by the assumption that the privilege against self-
incrimination can only be violated when the compelled testimony
is used to convict the witness in a criminal prosecution. 9 ' And,
because foreign countries are not subject to the U.S. Constitution,
there cannot be a violation of the privilege when foreign prose-
cutions are involved. 9 '
The court goes too far in trying to reduce the privilege to
its essence. The interpretation of the privilege's history, cur-
rently in vogue among scholars, cannot be read as license for
courts to impose a singular reading of the privilege, as Gecas
seems to suggest. The history of the privilege is far too am-
biguous'12 and case law is far too unsettled for such an approach.'93
Furthermore, it is not clear whether or how the privilege's ori-
gins should influence the Fifth Amendment's application to
contemporary problems.'9 4
The difficulty of determining the relevance of the privilege's
history is compounded when the circumstances of the Gecas
case are considered. By rejecting Gecas's agency argument,'95
it ignored important practical considerations. The OSI has
been given broad powers by the Department of Justice to seek
out and prosecute suspected Nazi collaborators.'96 Once an
American court compels Gecas's testimony and orders his de-
portation, information gathered before and during the trial,
189. Hehmholz, supra note 24, at 4 (noting the continued disagreement
about the meaning of the privilege).
190. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1430.
19L See id.
192. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Parts I.C-D.
194. See Helmholz, supra note 25, at 990 (noting that it is not clear how an
expanded understanding of the privilege's history should affect current con-
troversies concerning the privilege's scope).
195. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1433-34.
196. See supra note 81.
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including compelled testimony, will likely be shared with the
foreign governments prosecuting Gecas.
197
The Second Circuit correctly noted this danger and pointed
out that the United States government will have the greatest
interest in compelling testimony when the witness faces the
greatest risk of foreign prosecution.' If, for example, journalists
or historians or the OSI itself, discover that a high-profile
American resident is alleged to have broken foreign laws,
popular media and international diplomatic pressure will en-
courage prosecutors to extract the accused's testimony at all
costs. The Eleventh Circuit's approach puts the person most in
need of protection against self-incrimination outside the privi-
lege's reach. Such a situation frustrates the privilege's dual
purposes of protecting against an overreaching government
and preserving individual dignity. Thus, while it purports to
uncover the privilege's real purpose in its lengthy historical
discussion, the court ignores considerations that can only be
understood in the modern context.
The Gecas court's categorical denial of Fifth Amendment
claims when there is a danger of foreign prosecution forces it to
explain away contrary Supreme Court precedent and to con-
struct a seamless historical account to support its holding. The
compelling nature of the Supreme Court opinions in the im-
munity cases and the wide dispute regarding the privilege's
policy and history make this an impossible task. The Gecas
court attempts to construct an airtight box around the privilege
and thereby exclude cases involving foreign law. However,
precedent, history, and common sense tell us that the box is ac-
tually full of holes; Fifth Amendment cases involving conse-
quences outside the United States must naturally creep in.
CONCLUSION
In 1979, the Department of Justice created the OSI for the
purpose of seeking out persons suspected of collaborating with
the Nazi government during World War II. Now, two decades
later, the fruits of the OSI's efforts have crystallized a difficult
and unresolved constitutional question: Does the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination apply where a
witness faces criminal prosecution in a foreign country? Gecas
v. United States held that the privilege does not apply because
197. See supra note 81.
198. See supra note 86.
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it can be violated only upon the witness's conviction. And,
when such a conviction occurs outside the United States and
involves a non-citizen, there is no violation of the Constitution.
The Gecas court's approach is a laudable aftempt to re-
solve this issue with a straightforward, categorical approach.
However, its assumption that the privilege can only be violated
upon the use of the compelled testimony contradicts Supreme
Court cases upholding the protection against both compulsion
and use of testimony. Furthermore, the Gecas court's singular
interpretation of the privilege's policy and history ignores the
multiple meanings the Self-Incrimination Clause has come to
represent. The Supreme Court should acknowledge the privi-
lege's indeterminate history and the increasingly international
nature of law enforcement and interpret the privilege to cover
cases in which there is the potential for foreign prosecution.

